Daniel sent us a theory. And I want to read it out properly, because it's got a lot of moving parts and I think it deserves to be heard in full before we start pulling it apart.
Go for it.
The theory goes like this. The US has grown hesitant about the Iran operation, possibly because Trump has acknowledged the viability of recovering uranium from Iran through negotiation rather than destruction. The snap ceasefire deal with Lebanon is a ruse, designed to shift the burden of maintaining the ceasefire off the US and onto Israel. The conflict over the Strait of Hormuz is largely performative. Lebanon has made a performative commitment to rid the country of Hezbollah, but the real purpose is to deflect responsibility for any escalation back onto Iran. The US and Iran have quietly engineered a mutually agreeable offramp, leaving Israel to finish the war objectives unilaterally if it wants them finished at all. Iran then uses the Lebanon ceasefire and the ambiguity around scope as a mechanism to resume war when it's ready, while Israel can probe Iran using the same ambiguity. Both sides are urgently preparing for a second round. Israel may be using civilian readiness signals and relaxed wartime restrictions as deliberate disinformation. Iran is using the Strait of Hormuz to distract from its real focus. And Daniel's prediction is that the Lebanon ceasefire will unravel, and full war resumes during or shortly before Yom Ha'atzmaut. The challenge to us, specifically, is to grade the theory, critique it piece by piece, and render a final judgment.
That is a lot of theory for a Friday.
And the timing matters. The ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon was announced on April sixteenth. Hezbollah launched a rocket barrage within hours of that announcement. So we are already in the phase Daniel is describing, where the question isn't whether the ceasefire holds, it's whether it was ever meant to.
And that's the entry point. Because if you take the ceasefire at face value, the story is: diplomatic progress, de-escalation, regional breathing room. If you take Daniel's framing, the story is almost the opposite. The ceasefire is a load-bearing element in a much more complex architecture, and its fragility isn't a bug, it's a feature.
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Doing its thing. So we've got Daniel's full theory on the table. Where do we even start pulling at the threads?
I think we start with the claim that has the most immediate evidence for or against it, which is the US hesitancy claim. Because that's the load-bearing pillar of the whole thing. If the US hasn't actually gotten cold feet on Iran, then a lot of the downstream architecture in Daniel's theory doesn't hold. The ceasefire as a ruse, the offramp engineering, all of it depends on there being a genuine shift in American appetite for the operation.
Daniel pins the hesitancy to something specific. Trump acknowledging the viability of recovering uranium through negotiation rather than destroying the program militarily. That's a fairly precise claim about what changed in Washington's calculus.
And there's actually something to it. The posture coming out of the administration has been notably ambiguous on what the end state looks like for Iran's nuclear program. There have been signals, not always consistent signals, but signals that a deal involving monitored enrichment caps, or even some form of uranium transfer arrangement, is on the table in a way it wasn't six months ago. The question is whether that ambiguity represents genuine strategic recalibration or whether it's negotiating theater.
The classic problem with reading Trump's moves is that negotiating theater and genuine recalibration can look identical from the outside until they don't.
And that's where Daniel's theory is doing something interesting but also something risky. He's essentially arguing that the theater has become the policy. That the US has decided, at some level, that a negotiated nuclear arrangement is acceptable, and everything else, the ceasefire, the Hormuz activity, is downstream of that decision.
Which would be a significant shift. Because the Israeli position on Iranian enrichment has never been remotely compatible with a monitored-but-continuing enrichment framework. If Washington has genuinely moved toward accepting something like that, then yes, you'd expect to see exactly the kind of load-shifting Daniel is describing. Push the ceasefire maintenance onto Israel, let the Hormuz conflict stay loud but inconclusive, buy time for a deal.
The Hezbollah rocket barrage within hours of the ceasefire announcement is almost too perfect an illustration of what load-shifting looks like in practice. Because the immediate question after that barrage was: who responds, and how? If the US is underwriting the ceasefire, the US has to have a view on that. If the ceasefire is Israel's problem now, Israel absorbs the provocation or escalates unilaterally, and the diplomatic cost of escalation falls on Israel, not on Washington.
That's the ruse claim in its sharpest form. It's not that the ceasefire is fake in the sense that nobody signed anything. It's that the accountability structure has been quietly reassigned.
Lebanon's role in Daniel's theory is interesting here. The public statements from Lebanese officials about ridding the country of Hezbollah, and there have been some, are doing a specific kind of work in this framing. They're not a sincere commitment. They're a liability shield. Lebanon says the right things, which means if Hezbollah fires rockets anyway, the Lebanese government can say it tried, the international community has no particular reason to hold Lebanon accountable, and the escalation calculus lands on Iran as Hezbollah's actual patron.
Lebanon is essentially performing statehood on this issue in a way that's convenient for everyone except Israel.
That's a harsh way to put it, but it's not wrong. And it connects to a longer pattern. Lebanese governments have been performing sovereignty over Hezbollah for about two decades now. The novelty in Daniel's framing is that this performance is now being deliberately integrated into a larger diplomatic architecture rather than being tolerated as an awkward reality.
The Strait of Hormuz piece I find the most interesting to interrogate, actually. Because the performative claim there is doing a lot of work in the theory, and it's also the claim that's hardest to falsify. How do you distinguish a performative conflict from a real one that just hasn't escalated yet?
That's the right question. And I think the honest answer is you mostly can't, in real time. What you can do is look at the pattern of engagements and ask whether they're optimized for deterrence and signaling or for actual military effect. And what we've seen in the Strait, the incidents, the posturing, the back-and-forth, it has had a consistent quality of being loud enough to matter diplomatically but calibrated enough to not trigger the kind of shipping disruption that would bring in parties who aren't currently in the game.
Which is consistent with performative conflict. It's also consistent with both sides being cautious about accidentally starting something bigger than they intend.
And that's where I'd push back on Daniel's framing a little. Calling it performative implies a level of coordination and intentionality between Iran and the US that may be more than what's actually there. You can get the same observable pattern from two actors who are both independently trying to stay below an escalation threshold, without any explicit or implicit agreement about the performance.
The question is whether the calibration is coordinated or emergent.
And Daniel's theory requires it to be at least partially coordinated. That's the mutually agreeable offramp claim. The US and Iran have, in some form, agreed on an exit ramp that leaves the nuclear program partially intact and leaves Israel to pursue whatever remaining objectives it has without American backing.
Which, if true, would be one of the more consequential diplomatic developments in this region in a long time. And also one of the least likely to be publicly acknowledged by anyone involved.
That's actually an argument in favor of Daniel's framing. The things that are hardest to confirm publicly are often the things that are most operationally real. The US and Iran have a history of back-channel arrangements that only become legible in retrospect. The 2015 nuclear deal framework was being quietly negotiated for over a year before anyone acknowledged it publicly. The Oman channel was active for months before it surfaced.
Absence of public confirmation is not strong evidence against the theory.
It's almost expected, if the theory is right.
The disinformation piece at the end of Daniel's theory, Israel using civilian readiness signals and relaxed wartime restrictions as deliberate misdirection, that's the part I keep coming back to. Because it's either a very sophisticated read on Israeli information operations, or it's a step too far into mirror-imaging, where you assume the adversary is as deliberately layered as you are.
I want to dig into that properly, because I think it's actually one of the more testable claims in the theory, and the evidence cuts in interesting directions.
We should get into the Yom Ha'atzmaut prediction specifically, because that's where Daniel is putting a stake in the ground with an actual timeline.
That's the falsifiable bit. Which I appreciate. A theory with a specific predictive claim is a theory you can actually grade.
Let's get into the machinery of this properly.
Let's actually put the theory on the table properly, because Daniel laid it out in some detail and I want to make sure we're grading the right thing. Here's what he wrote, roughly verbatim. The US has grown hesitant about the Iran operation, possibly because Trump has acknowledged the viability of recovering uranium through negotiation. The snap ceasefire with Lebanon is a ruse designed to shift the burden of maintaining it from the US to Israel. The Strait of Hormuz conflict is largely performative. Lebanon has performatively committed to ridding itself of Hezbollah, not out of sincerity but to deflect responsibility for escalation onto Iran. The US and Iran have engineered a mutually agreeable offramp that leaves Israel to finish its war objectives unilaterally. Both sides are now using the ceasefire's ambiguity as a mechanism, Iran to resume when ready, Israel to probe. And Israel may be using civilian readiness signals and relaxed wartime restrictions as deliberate disinformation, while Iran uses the Strait as misdirection from its real focus. The prediction sitting on top of all of that is that the ceasefire unravels, and full war resumes around Yom Ha'atzmaut.
It's a unified theory. Not just a cluster of observations but a single architecture with a load-bearing claim at the center and a falsifiable prediction at the end. That's actually more rigorous than most geopolitical commentary you'll read this week.
The question is whether the architecture is describing reality or constructing a very elegant story about reality, which is a different thing.
The way you distinguish those is by going claim by claim and asking what evidence would look different if the claim were false. Which is what we're going to do.
The current context matters here too, because Daniel isn't theorizing about a hypothetical situation. The ceasefire is live. The Hormuz activity is ongoing. The US-Iran negotiating channel, whatever form it's actually taking, is active. We're inside the window the theory is describing, which means some of this is testable right now, not just in retrospect.
The April sixteenth ceasefire announcement is the event everything else is being read against. And the Hezbollah rocket barrage within hours of that announcement is either a serious challenge to the theory, because it happened too fast for any ruse to have been properly set up, or it's the first piece of evidence for it, because the barrage immediately raised the question of who owns the response obligation.
The answer to that question, in the days since, has been notably unclear—which, as it turns out, is precisely the point.
That ambiguity is actually doing structural work in Daniel's framing. Because if the response obligation is unclear, nobody has to respond. And if nobody has to respond, the ceasefire technically holds, even after a rocket barrage, which is a remarkable thing to be able to say.
Walk me through the US hesitancy claim specifically, because that's the load-bearing pillar. If that's wrong, the rest of the architecture doesn't follow.
So the core of it is that Trump has signaled, in various ways, that recovering Iranian uranium through negotiation is a viable path. Not just as a talking point but as a genuine strategic preference. And if you take that seriously, it changes the calculus on military action fundamentally. Because a strike on Iranian nuclear infrastructure makes sense as a policy if the goal is permanent denial. It makes much less sense if you think you can get the enriched material handed over through a deal, because then you've just bombed your way out of a negotiating position.
There's been reporting on the US-Iran negotiating channel. The Oman track has been active again. And the public signals from Trump's team have been notably ambiguous about what the actual red line is on enrichment levels.
That's the thing. The administration has not said clearly that enrichment must stop entirely. What they've said is closer to enrichment must not reach weapons-grade imminently. Which is a meaningfully different position. It's closer to a monitoring and verification framework than to a zero-enrichment demand. And that gap between those two positions is where Daniel's hesitancy claim lives.
Israel's position has never accommodated that gap. Zero enrichment, full stop, has been the Israeli red line for years. So if Washington has quietly shifted to a monitoring framework, you have a genuine strategic divergence, not just a tactical disagreement about timing.
A strategic divergence of that kind would explain a lot of the behavioral signals Daniel is pointing to. Why the ceasefire gets announced so quickly. Why the accountability for the post-barrage response is left deliberately murky. Why the Hormuz activity stays at a consistent simmer rather than either resolving or escalating.
On the ceasefire as ruse, the timing is striking. That's not a negotiated framework, that's a pause. A ten-day ceasefire with no stated mechanism for verification and no clarity on who enforces it is not a peace arrangement. It's a calendar entry.
The Hezbollah rocket barrage within hours of the announcement, I keep coming back to this, is either catastrophically bad timing for the ruse theory or it's actually consistent with it. Because if the ceasefire's real purpose is to transfer accountability, then Hezbollah testing it immediately is almost convenient. It establishes right away that the burden of enforcement is on whoever claims ownership of the ceasefire. And if Israel doesn't respond, the ceasefire holds on paper. If Israel does respond, Israel is the escalating party.
It's a trap with a very short fuse.
Lebanon's performance in this, the public statements about disarming Hezbollah or removing it from the south, those statements are doing something very specific in international law terms. They're creating a record. Not a capability or an intention, just a record. Which is enough to shift the diplomatic liability if things go wrong.
Lebanon has been doing this particular dance for a long time. The novelty you'd have to accept, if Daniel is right, is that this time the dance is being choreographed rather than improvised.
The Hormuz piece is where I want to be careful about what the theory is actually claiming. Because performative doesn't mean harmless or inconsequential. Performative conflict can have real economic effects, real insurance premium effects, real shipping route effects, even if neither side intends it to escalate. The question is whether the military engagements themselves are calibrated for signal rather than effect.
The pattern of what's been happening in the Strait does have that quality. Incidents that are visible enough to generate headlines and diplomatic activity, but contained enough that no major shipping actor has actually rerouted at scale.
Which is consistent with both parties independently managing escalation thresholds. It doesn't require coordination to produce that pattern. Two cautious actors can generate the same observable behavior as two coordinating actors. That's the evidentiary problem with the performative claim.
Daniel's theory requires you to accept coordination where the evidence is also consistent with parallel caution.
That's the weakest link in the chain, for me. Not because the coordination is impossible, the Oman channel and various back-channel arrangements make it entirely plausible, but because you'd need something more than the behavioral pattern to confirm it. You'd need a signal that the calibration is joint rather than coincidental.
Those signals, if they exist, are exactly the kind of thing that wouldn't be visible from the outside.
Which is simultaneously the most frustrating and the most honest answer. The theory is unfalsifiable in that specific joint, not because it's wrong, but because the evidence it would generate looks identical to evidence for a different theory.
That said, unfalsifiable at one joint doesn't invalidate the whole structure. You can have a theory where most of the claims are testable and one load-bearing connection has to be taken on inference.
Daniel is upfront about that, in a way. The prediction he hangs on the end, the Yom Ha'atzmaut timeline, is doing the falsification work for the whole theory. If the ceasefire holds well past that date, the theory needs revision. If it unravels on roughly that schedule, the architecture looks a lot more solid.
Which means we're currently inside the test window. The theory is either going to look prescient or it's going to look like a very elegant story that the facts didn't cooperate with.
That's actually a better epistemic position than most geopolitical analysis leaves you in—especially when you consider Lebanon's role in all of this.
Lebanon's commitment piece is worth sitting with, because it's the most theatrically obvious part of the theory and also the hardest to dismiss outright.
The public statements from Lebanese officials since the ceasefire have a very specific texture to them. They're not saying we have disarmed Hezbollah. They're saying we are committed to a Lebanon free of armed groups outside state authority. Which is a formulation that has existed in UN Security Council Resolution 1701 since two thousand and six. It is not new. It is not a concession. It is a restatement of a position Lebanon has nominally held for twenty years without acting on it.
The novelty isn't the commitment. The novelty is the context in which the commitment is being restated.
And the context is what gives Daniel's ruse framing its traction. Because if you're Lebanon and you want to avoid being blamed for the next round of fighting, you don't need to actually disarm Hezbollah. You just need to have said, loudly and on record, that you tried. Resolution 1701 gives you the language. The ceasefire gives you the occasion. And the Hezbollah rocket barrage within hours of the announcement gives you the narrative that the armed group acted against the wishes of the Lebanese state.
It's a liability transfer executed in real time.
It's worth noting that Lebanon as a state has essentially no capacity to disarm Hezbollah even if it wanted to. The Lebanese Armed Forces have somewhere around eighty thousand personnel on paper. Hezbollah has a more capable military apparatus than most regional states. The commitment is structurally unenforceable, which means Lebanon can make it without any real cost, and then point to the structural impossibility when it fails.
The cynic's read is that the commitment was never meant to be kept. The optimist's read is that it signals something about where Lebanese political elites want to position themselves after the war. Both can be true simultaneously.
The optimist's read actually supports Daniel's theory in a different way. Because if Lebanese elites are trying to position away from Hezbollah dependence, they have an incentive to let the ceasefire fail on Hezbollah's terms rather than Lebanon's. Which is exactly the structure Daniel is describing.
The US-Iran offramp is the claim I find most operationally interesting, because it's the one that requires the most active engineering from both sides.
There's a historical pattern here that's worth grounding. The two thousand and fifteen Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was itself an engineered offramp. Not just a negotiated deal, but a face-saving architecture where both sides could claim something. Iran got sanctions relief and implicit recognition of its enrichment program. The US got a monitoring framework and a slowdown. The deal didn't resolve the underlying conflict. It created a structured pause with enough ambiguity baked in that both sides could interpret it favorably.
It lasted until it didn't.
Until it didn't. And the current negotiating environment, whatever is happening through the Oman channel and through whatever other back channels are active, has some of the same structural features. Iran needs economic relief and international legitimacy. The US, or at least Trump's team, wants a deal it can call a win without committing to a military operation that has unpredictable downstream consequences. Israel wants permanent denial. Those three interests are not reconcilable in a single agreement. So the question is which two of the three get accommodated.
Daniel's answer is that the US and Iran are the two that get accommodated, and Israel gets handed the bill.
Which is a uncomfortable claim if you take it seriously. Because it would mean the US is engineering a diplomatic outcome that it knows Israel cannot accept, and is counting on Israeli military action to provide the escalatory pressure that makes the deal look like a de-escalation.
That's a cold piece of statecraft.
And I'm not saying Daniel is right about it. But the logic is internally consistent. You've seen versions of this before in US Middle East policy, where American and Israeli interests diverge quietly while the public posture maintains alignment. The divergence on enrichment red lines we talked about earlier is the same pattern appearing again.
What would change your mind on the offramp claim specifically?
A clear, unambiguous US statement that any deal with Iran must include Israeli security guarantees and Israeli consent. That would close the gap. The fact that no such statement has been made, despite the obvious diplomatic need for one, is itself a data point.
The silence is doing a lot of work.
A lot of work. And the Yom Ha'atzmaut prediction sits on top of all of this as the load-bearing test. If the logic is right, you'd expect the ceasefire to hold just long enough for the diplomatic record to be established, and then to fail in a way that either Iran or Hezbollah can be blamed for. Yom Ha'atzmaut is about ten days out from the ceasefire announcement. That's enough time to establish the record. Not enough time for any serious enforcement mechanism to be put in place.
It's also symbolically loaded in a way that would matter to Israeli decision-making. You don't want to be resuming full-scale war during the independence celebration. But you also don't want to let the window close entirely before you've reestablished military pressure.
The timing logic is actually one of the stronger parts of the prediction. It doesn't require you to believe anything conspiratorial. It just requires you to believe that both sides understand the calendar and are managing their actions against it.
Which is the most basic thing you'd expect from any competent military and diplomatic apparatus.
The ceasefire's structural fragility makes the timing almost self-fulfilling. A ten-day pause with no enforcement mechanism, under active rocket fire on day one, is not designed to hold indefinitely. The question is whether it unravels on Israel's initiative, on Hezbollah's initiative, or on Iran's signal to Hezbollah. Daniel's theory says it's the third. That's the specific claim the next ten days will either support or undermine.
We're not just analyzing a theory. We're watching a test run in real time.
Which is the most intellectually uncomfortable kind of analysis. Because if the theory is right, the events we're about to watch were already scripted before we started talking about them.
And the uncomfortable part is that scripted doesn't mean wrong. Scripted just means the actors understood their incentives well enough to behave predictably. Which is actually what good geopolitical theory is supposed to capture.
Let's grade it. Because Daniel asked us to, and I think we owe him a real answer rather than a cloud of qualifications.
Start with the US hesitancy claim. That one I find largely credible. The divergence between Washington and Jerusalem on enrichment red lines is not speculative. It's visible in the public statements if you read them carefully. The Oman channel is active. Trump's team has signaled that uranium recovery via negotiation is a viable outcome. I'd give that claim a seven out of ten for plausibility. Strong foundation, some uncertainty about whether it's strategic recalibration or negotiating theater.
I'd go slightly higher. Seven and a half. The silence on Israeli consent, the absence of any clear US statement that a deal requires Israeli sign-off, that silence is not accidental. Diplomatic teams don't forget to say things. They choose not to say them.
The ceasefire as ruse. This one is harder to score because ruse implies intent, and intent is the thing you can't observe directly. What you can observe is that the structure of the ceasefire is consistent with the ruse hypothesis. Ten days, no enforcement, Hezbollah rocket barrage within hours, Lebanon restating a twenty-year-old commitment it has never acted on. If you're generous to the alternative hypothesis, maybe it's genuine incompetence rather than engineered theater. I'm not sure incompetence and theater produce meaningfully different outcomes here.
Six and a half from me on that one. The structure supports it. The intent is inferred. And the Hezbollah barrage happening that fast is either the most convenient piece of evidence for Daniel's theory or the most obvious sign that the ceasefire was always going to be symbolic.
The performative Hormuz claim. I've been skeptical of strong Hormuz closure scenarios for a while now, so I'm predisposed to think the conflict there is more calibrated than catastrophic. But Daniel's specific claim is coordination, not just parallel caution. And as Herman said, those two things generate the same observable evidence. Five out of ten from me. Plausible, not confirmable.
Five from me too. The Oman channel makes coordination possible. But possible and engineered are different thresholds. That's the weakest link in the chain, and I think Daniel would probably agree.
Lebanon's commitment as liability transfer. This is the part of the theory I find most immediately convincing, because it requires no conspiratorial inference at all. Lebanon made a structurally unenforceable commitment using language that's been on the books since two thousand and six. The incentive to do exactly what Daniel describes is obvious to any Lebanese political actor who can read a calendar. Eight out of ten.
Eight and a half. The only reason it's not a nine is that the optimist's version of the same behavior, genuine elite repositioning away from Hezbollah dependence, is also consistent with the evidence. But even the optimist's version produces the same outcome in the short term.
The US-Iran offramp as engineered architecture. This is the cold statecraft claim. The one that requires you to believe Washington and Tehran are cooperating to produce an outcome that Israel cannot accept, and that Israel's military response is part of the design. I find the logic coherent. I find the historical precedent real, the JCPOA structure is analogous. But I'm aware that coherent logic and historical precedent aren't the same as evidence for this specific instance. Six out of ten.
Six and a half. The divergence on red lines is the evidence. Not proof, but evidence. And the fact that the US has not publicly committed to Israeli consent as a precondition for any deal is a significant omission at a significant moment.
The Yom Ha'atzmaut prediction. We're inside the test window. The ceasefire started April sixteenth. We're talking about a structure that Daniel says cannot hold ten days. The timing logic is sound, the symbolic weight of the date is real, the enforcement vacuum is real. I'd give the prediction itself a six out of ten probability of being roughly right, with wide error bars on exactly when and exactly how.
I'd say six as well. The direction of the prediction is more confident than the specific timing. Ceasefire fails, war resumes, Israel and Iran both use the ambiguity as cover. That directional claim I'd give an eight. The Yom Ha'atzmaut specificity is where my confidence drops.
If you had to give Daniel's theory a single score.
Seven out of ten for the theory as a whole. It's unified, it's internally consistent, it makes falsifiable predictions, and most of the individual components have real evidential support. The weak point is the coordination inference on Hormuz, and the strong point is the Lebanon liability transfer, which requires almost no inference at all. What's your number?
Six and a half. The theory is better than most of what I read on this conflict. The architecture is rigorous. But I keep coming back to the gap between describing incentives and claiming those incentives are being consciously orchestrated by all parties simultaneously. Daniel might be right that the outcome looks engineered even if the engineering is partly emergent. That's a more interesting claim and also a harder one to score. So six and a half, with the caveat that if the ceasefire unravels on roughly the timeline Daniel described, I'm revising upward.
Six and a half with a revision clause. Daniel would probably take that.
He might push back on the Hormuz piece. I think he'd argue the coordination inference is stronger than we're giving it credit for. But that's a conversation for when we find out whether the ceasefire actually holds.
Which we will. Ten days from now someone's going to be right and someone's going to be revising their priors. The open question I keep sitting with is what happens to Lebanon as a political entity if Daniel's liability transfer thesis is correct. Because if Hezbollah resumes operations and the Lebanese government has just publicly vowed to disarm them, Lebanon doesn't just lose credibility. It loses whatever thin claim it had to sovereign control of its own territory.
That's a destabilization that outlasts any particular round of fighting. The Lebanese state has been hollowed out before. It can be hollowed out further. The question is whether there's a version of this where the Lebanese political class actually uses the diplomatic moment to reposition, or whether the ceasefire expires and they're right back where they started in two thousand and six.
My instinct is back where they started. But I've been wrong about Lebanon's capacity for self-destruction before. Usually by underestimating it.
The broader regional picture is hard to read right now. If the theory is even partially right, you've got a US-Iran channel that's active, an Israeli military that's preparing for round two, and a Lebanon that's structurally incapable of delivering on its own commitments. That's not a stable equilibrium. That's three clocks running at different speeds in the same room.
Someone's going to be surprised when they don't all go off at the same time.
Daniel gave us a rigorous piece of thinking. Whatever our scores say, the framework is better than most of what's circulating. We'll see how it ages.
Thanks to Hilbert Flumingtop for producing, and to Modal for keeping the infrastructure running. If this episode made you think, a review on Spotify goes a long way. This has been My Weird Prompts. I'm Corn.
I'm Herman Poppleberry.
