Hey everyone, welcome back to My Weird Prompts. I am Corn, and I am sitting here in our living room in Jerusalem with my brother, the man who probably knows more about the internal workings of a credit card chip than the people who designed them.
That is high praise, Corn. Herman Poppleberry at your service. And you know, after that voice note Daniel left us this morning, I have actually been thinking about exactly that. Daniel was asking about why it is so easy for a merchant to know everything about us, while we have to jump through hoops just to see our own data.
It is a classic power imbalance, right? Daniel mentioned how platforms like PayPal or Google Wallet make it surprisingly difficult to just... get your data out. If you want to use a third party budgeting app or just run your own analysis in a spreadsheet, you are often stuck with these clunky exports or, even worse, having to use scraping tools that basically require you to hand over your login credentials to yet another company.
Exactly. And we actually touched on some of the structural reasons for this back in a previous episode, when we talked about the fight for financial data and why APIs matter so much. But Daniel’s prompt today takes it a step further. He is not just asking about the data access, but the actual security of the transaction itself. The physical act of sliding a card versus using a digital wallet, and whether we can ever truly have ephemeral, one-time transactions in a system that was basically designed in the nineteen sixties.
It is a great point. Let’s start with that physical point of sale. I think most people have a vague sense of dread when they hand their card to a waiter who disappears into the back of a restaurant, or even when they insert it into a gas station pump that looks a little bit... off. Herman, what is actually happening there? How much risk are we really taking when we use a physical card in February of twenty twenty-six?
Well, the risk has evolved, but it definitely has not disappeared. In the old days, the big threat was skimming. You would have a device placed over the card slot that would read the magnetic stripe. The magnetic stripe is essentially just a piece of tape that stores your card number, your name, and the expiration date in plain text. It is incredibly easy to copy.
But we have moved past the magnetic stripe for the most part, right? Most of us are using the chip now.
We are, and that is a huge leap forward. That is the EMV standard, which stands for Europay, Mastercard, and Visa. When you dip that chip, you are not just handing over your card number. The chip is actually a tiny computer. It performs a cryptographic handshake with the terminal and generates a unique code for that specific transaction. So, even if a hacker intercepts that code, they cannot use it to make a second purchase.
So, if the chip is so secure, why are we still hearing about card theft at physical locations?
Because of shimming. Instead of a skimmer on the outside, thieves use a shimmer, which is a paper thin device that sits inside the card reader. While it cannot easily clone the chip’s cryptographic signature, it can sometimes intercept the data if the terminal falls back to a less secure communication mode. Plus, we are seeing a rise in deep-insert shimmers that are almost impossible to detect without opening the machine. And let's not forget that many cards still have that magnetic stripe on the back for backward compatibility. If a terminal is rigged to force a swipe instead of a dip, you are right back to nineteen seventy levels of security.
That is the part that drives me crazy. The system is only as strong as its weakest link, and the weakest link is usually a legacy feature kept alive for convenience. But this brings us to Daniel’s question about digital wallets. When I use Google Wallet or Apple Pay on my phone, am I just sending that same vulnerable card number through the air instead of through a slot?
This is where it gets really cool, Corn. And honestly, this is the part that should make everyone feel a bit better about the future. When you load a card into a digital wallet, the service does not actually store or transmit your real credit card number. This is a process called tokenization.
Okay, break that down for me. If the merchant doesn't get my card number, what do they get?
They get what is called a Token, or more specifically, a Device Account Number. When you set up the wallet, your bank issues a specific, digital-only number that is tied to your phone or your watch. It is not your actual Primary Account Number, which is the sixteen digit number printed on your physical card.
So if someone hacks the merchant and steals that number, they can’t use it to buy things elsewhere?
Exactly. That token is locked to that specific device and that specific wallet provider. If I stole your Google Wallet token and tried to use it on my Samsung phone, the bank’s authorization server would see the mismatch and decline it instantly. It is like having a valet key for your car. It can start the engine and let you drive, but it won’t open the trunk or the glove box.
That is a great analogy. But Daniel’s point about privacy is still lingering in my mind. Even if the merchant doesn't get my real card number, Google or Apple certainly knows exactly where I am, what I am buying, and how much I spent. We talked about this a bit in a previous episode when we looked at the rise of invisible security. It feels like we are trading physical security for a different kind of data surveillance.
You hit the nail on the head, but there is a nuance here. Apple Pay is generally more privacy-centric because they use a physical Secure Element on the device. Apple claims they do not know what you bought or where. Google Wallet, on the other hand, often uses a cloud-based approach called Host Card Emulation. While it is just as secure against hackers, Google’s servers are involved in the transaction flow, which lets them offer things like Smart Loyalty programs. They are essentially trading privacy for convenience and rewards. They become the ultimate bookkeeper of your life.
And that brings us to the ephemeral part of the prompt. Daniel asked if there are technologies for creating ephemeral financial transactions within the conventional credit card system. Basically, can we have the security of a digital wallet without the long term data trail or the risk of a persistent token?
The answer is yes, and it is getting more sophisticated. We have Virtual Card Numbers, or VCNs. Services like Privacy dot com or even native features from banks like Capital One let you generate a new sixteen digit number for every merchant. Some even offer merchant-locked cards that only work at one specific store, or single-use cards that self-destruct after one transaction.
I have used those before. It feels like the closest thing we have to digital cash within the traditional banking system.
It is. And we are even seeing physical cards now with Dynamic CVV technology—little OLED screens on the back of the card where the three digit security code changes every hour. It makes the physical card nearly as ephemeral as a digital one. However, the catch is that these services often still collect a lot of data about you to comply with Know Your Customer laws. You are moving the trust from the merchant to the virtual card provider.
It seems like we are constantly playing this game of who do you trust more? Do you trust the local coffee shop with your card number? Probably not. Do you trust Google? Maybe. Do you trust a startup that generates virtual cards? That is another question entirely.
It really is. And Daniel mentioned blockchain as a potential alternative. And while we could spend ten episodes on that, the reality is that most public blockchains are actually less private than the banking system. If I know your wallet address, I can see every single transaction you have ever made.
Right, the transparency of the ledger is a bug, not a feature, if you are looking for privacy. We discussed digital fingerprinting in a previous episode, and the same principles apply here. If your financial identity is public, you are essentially leaving a trail of breadcrumbs for anyone to follow.
There are privacy-focused coins like Monero or Zcash that use zero-knowledge proofs to hide the sender, receiver, and amount. But as Daniel noted, if we want to stay within the conventional system—the one that lets us buy groceries and pay our rent—we are stuck with the tools we have.
So, let's talk about the practical side for our listeners. If someone is listening to this and they want to maximize their security at a physical point of sale today, what is the hierarchy of safety?
Okay, let's rank them from worst to best. At the bottom, the absolute worst, is swiping your card's magnetic stripe. Avoid that at all costs. If a machine tells you the chip reader is broken and you have to swipe, I would honestly consider paying cash or going somewhere else. Those machines are often targets for jackpotting attacks where hackers take over the whole terminal.
I have actually done that at gas stations. It feels a bit paranoid, but those outdoor pumps are notorious for being rigged.
It is not paranoid if they are actually out to get you, Corn! The next level up is dipping the chip. It is much better, but as we discussed, it is still vulnerable to shimming. Above that is using the contactless tap feature on your physical card. Tap-to-pay uses the same EMV technology as the chip, but because there is no physical contact with a reader inside a slot, it is much harder to shim or skim.
And the gold standard?
The gold standard for physical transactions is a digital wallet like Apple Pay or Google Wallet on your phone or watch. It combines the cryptographic security of the chip with the tokenization we talked about. Plus, it usually requires a biometric unlock—your face or your thumbprint—before the transaction can even happen. Even if someone steals your phone, they can't go on a shopping spree with your cards.
That makes sense. But what about the data access issue Daniel started with? The fact that it is so hard to get our own data out of these platforms. Why are they so stingy with it?
Well, think about what that data is worth. Your transaction history is a perfect map of your habits, your health, your relationships, and your future needs. If Google or PayPal makes it easy for you to take that data to a competitor, they lose their moat. They want to be the only ones who can provide you with insights or targeted offers.
It is the walled garden approach to finance. They keep the data in, and they keep the insights for themselves. And because there is no federal law in many places—though this is starting to change with things like the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's rules on open banking—they have no incentive to make it easy for you.
Actually, Corn, we are in the middle of a huge regulatory tug-of-war right now. The CFPB's Section 1033 Personal Financial Data Rights rule aims to require secure API data sharing with a phased compliance starting April 1, 2026, for larger firms, but it faces ongoing legal challenges from industry groups that could delay or alter implementation. The big banks are fighting it because they don't want to lose control of that data, and the fintechs are scrambling because they still have to rely on screen scraping.
It feels like such a mess. You want to be secure, so you use a digital wallet. But then you want to be private, so you worry about the wallet provider. Then you want to manage your money, so you have to give your password to a third party scraper. It is a lot of trade-offs.
It is. But I think the aha moment for me, and hopefully for Daniel and our listeners, is realizing that security and privacy are not the same thing. You can have a transaction that is perfectly secure from hackers but completely transparent to a corporation.
That is an important distinction. So, if we look toward the future, what is the weird prompt version of a solution here? Is there a way to get the best of both worlds?
I think the future lies in something called Decentralized Identity, or self-sovereign identity. The W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0 advanced to Candidate Recommendation in 2024 and continues toward full standardization. Imagine if instead of a bank or Google vouching for you, you had a digital vault on your own device that contained verifiable credentials.
Like a digital passport that I control?
Exactly. When you go to buy something, your vault would share a proof that you have the funds, without ever revealing your actual account number or even your name if it isn't necessary for the transaction. The merchant gets paid, the bank authorizes the move, but neither of them gets a permanent hook into your identity. The European Union mandates that member states provide digital identity wallets to citizens by May 2026 under the EUDI Regulation.
That sounds amazing, but how far away are we from that being a reality at a local shawarma shop here in Jerusalem?
We are closer than you think in terms of technology, but miles away in terms of adoption. The payment networks—the Visas and Mastercards of the world—have a huge incentive to keep things exactly as they are. They make billions on the current system. Changing the fundamental architecture of how identity and payments interact is a massive undertaking.
It always comes back to the incentives, doesn't it? In the meantime, I guess the best we can do is be smart about which tools we use for which jobs. Use the digital wallet for the security, use virtual cards for the privacy online, and maybe keep a little cash in your pocket for the truly anonymous stuff.
Spoken like a true Poppleberry. And honestly, just being aware of these mechanisms is half the battle. When you understand that your phone is sending a token and not a number, you can make better decisions about when and where to use it.
I think that is a great place to wrap up the core of this. But before we go, I want to circle back to something Daniel mentioned about the struggle to get data. Herman, do you have any tips for people who are frustrated with their bank's clunky export tools?
Well, the first thing is to check if your bank supports Open Banking protocols. Even with the regulatory delays, many larger banks are providing legitimate API access through services like Plaid or Akoya. It is still not a direct download to your computer, but it is much safer than giving your password to a scraper. Also, look for the download as OFX or QFX option instead of just CSV. Those formats are specifically designed for financial data and are much less likely to have errors when you import them into a budgeting tool.
Good tip. And for the developers or the really nerdy listeners out there, there are actually some great open source projects on GitHub that can help you automate the retrieval of your own data if you are comfortable running a little bit of code. It is a bit of a hacker solution, but sometimes that is what it takes to get your own information back from these giants.
It really is. It is your data, after all. You should not have to ask for permission to see it.
Exactly. Well, this has been a fascinating deep dive. Daniel, thanks for sending that voice note in. It really highlights the tension between the convenience of modern payments and the loss of control over our own financial lives.
It really does. And hey, if you are listening and you have been enjoying these deep dives into the weird corners of technology and life, we would really appreciate it if you could leave us a review on your podcast app or on Spotify. We have been doing this for over two hundred episodes now, and it is the reviews and the word-of-mouth from our regular listeners that really help us grow.
Yeah, it genuinely makes a huge difference. We love seeing where you all are listening from and what prompts you want us to tackle next. You can always find our full archive and a contact form at myweirdprompts dot com. We have an RSS feed there too if you want to subscribe directly.
And remember, if you are at a gas station and the card reader looks like it was glued on by a toddler, just keep driving. Your bank account will thank you.
Solid advice. Thanks for listening to My Weird Prompts. I am Corn.
And I am Herman Poppleberry. We will see you in the next one.
Peace.
