Hey everyone, welcome back to My Weird Prompts. We are sitting here in our usual spot in Jerusalem, and I have to say, the atmosphere outside lately has been a bit heavy. You can feel the weight of everything happening in the region right now. It is February nineteenth, two thousand twenty six, and the air just feels different.
It is palpable, Corn. Herman Poppleberry here, and yeah, between the headlines about the fifteen day window for the latest diplomatic push and the massive military buildup we are seeing across the northern border, it is hard not to have these topics on the brain. Today's prompt from Daniel is about something that usually stays in the shadows, but given the current tensions, it is more relevant than ever. He wants us to dive into Israel's ballistic missile program, specifically the Jericho missiles, and look at how they compare to Iran's arsenal, along with the whole strategy behind nuclear ambiguity.
It is a heavy topic, for sure, but a necessary one if we want to understand the strategic balance in this part of the world. We have talked about the Iranian side of things recently, especially with their recent tests of the Khorramshahr four, but the Israeli side is often shrouded in much more mystery. Herman, I know you have been digging into the technical history of the Jericho program. Where does it even start? Because we are not just talking about a few rockets here; we are talking about decades of development that essentially mirrors the history of the state itself.
Exactly. The Jericho program is actually one of the oldest ballistic missile programs in the world outside of the major superpowers. It dates back to the early nineteen sixties. What is fascinating is that it actually started as a collaboration with the French. People often forget how close the Israeli French defense relationship was back then. The French company Dassault helped develop the first iteration, the Jericho One, which was based on their M D six hundred and twenty design. It was a short range missile, maybe five hundred kilometers, meant for regional deterrence. But after the nineteen sixty seven war and the subsequent arms embargoes imposed by Charles de Gaulle, Israel realized it couldn't rely on outside partners for its most critical strategic assets.
So they took it in house. That seems to be a recurring theme in Israeli defense history. If you can't buy it, or if the person selling it might stop, you build it yourself. It is that "never again" mentality applied to engineering. But how did it evolve from a short range tactical missile into what people now call an intercontinental ballistic missile, or an I C B M?
It was a gradual but very focused progression, driven by the changing geography of Israel's threats. The Jericho Two came along in the late seventies and eighties. That was a much more serious beast, a two stage solid fuel missile with a range of around one thousand five hundred to three thousand five hundred kilometers. This was developed primarily by Israel Aerospace Industries, or I A I. But the real game changer, the one that keeps analysts up at night, is the Jericho Three. This is the one that really puts Israel in that elite tier of missile powers. It was first tested around two thousand eight and became fully operational in the early twenty tens. It is estimated to have a range of anywhere from four thousand eight hundred to six thousand five hundred kilometers. Some analysts suggest that with a smaller payload or an improved booster stage, it could reach even further. That puts it squarely in the intercontinental category.
When you say solid fuel, why is that such a big deal? I know we have mentioned it before with Iranian missiles, but for the listeners, why does that change the strategic math so drastically?
It is all about launch time and readiness, Corn. Think of it this way: liquid fueled missiles are like old steam engines or a very complicated chemistry experiment. You have to fuel them up right before you use them because the fuel is often corrosive or unstable. That process takes hours and is very visible to satellites. If you are fueling a missile, your enemy knows you are about to launch, which makes your silos sitting ducks for a preemptive strike. Solid fuel is more like a battery. The fuel is a stable, rubbery substance already packed inside the missile. You can store it for years, and when the order comes, you can launch in minutes. For a small country like Israel, where the entire country is essentially the "front line" and every second counts in a conflict, that readiness is everything. It ensures that your deterrent is actually credible.
That makes sense. Now, Daniel's prompt asks for a comparison with the Iranian arsenal. We know Iran has a massive quantity of missiles. They have the Shahab, the Fattah, the Sejjil. How does the Jericho program stack up against that? Is it a matter of quality versus quantity, or is there more to it?
That is exactly the right way to look at it. Iran has arguably the largest and most diverse missile force in the Middle East. They have invested heavily in sheer numbers and a variety of delivery systems, from short range drones to medium range ballistic missiles like the Kheibar. Their goal seems to be the ability to overwhelm missile defenses through sheer volume—what military planners call a "saturation attack." Israel's approach with the Jericho is much more surgical. The Jericho program is not about having thousands of missiles; it is about having a highly reliable, extremely precise, and survivable second strike capability.
And the precision is the key there, right? Because a missile is only as good as its guidance system.
Precisely. We also have to look at the Shavit space launch vehicle as a proxy for this technology. Israel uses the Shavit to put its Ofeq reconnaissance satellites into orbit. Most experts agree that the Shavit is essentially a modified Jericho missile. The fact that Israel can reliably launch satellites into a retrograde orbit—which means they launch to the west, against the earth's rotation—proves a level of guidance and propulsion technology that is incredibly sophisticated. You launch west so that if the rocket fails, it falls into the Mediterranean rather than on your neighbors, but it requires much more power to overcome the earth's spin. It shows that they have mastered the physics of long range delivery in a way that very few countries have. Iran is getting better, especially with their recent satellite launches, but Israel has been doing this with high precision for decades.
So while Iran is building a massive fleet of various classes, Israel has built a very high tech, long range spear. But let's get to the elephant in the room, which Daniel brought up. These missiles aren't just for conventional explosives. We are talking about the suspected nuclear capability. Israel has this policy of nuclear ambiguity, or what is often called "amimut" in Hebrew. They neither confirm nor deny having nuclear weapons. Herman, why stay quiet? If you have them, wouldn't telling the world be a better deterrent?
That is the great paradox of nuclear strategy. You would think that shouting it from the rooftops would be the ultimate stay away sign. But for Israel, ambiguity has served a very specific set of strategic goals for over fifty years. It is a masterpiece of diplomatic tightrope walking. First, it avoids a direct regional arms race. If Israel officially declared itself a nuclear power, it would put immense pressure on countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey to start their own programs immediately to maintain prestige and balance. By staying ambiguous, Israel gives its neighbors a bit of a diplomatic out. They can say, "well, we don't know for sure, so we don't have to ruin our economies building our own nukes yet."
It is like a strategic polite fiction. Everyone knows, but because it isn't official, nobody has to react in a way that escalates the situation to a point of no return. It keeps the "nuclear threshold" from being crossed publicly.
Exactly. And the second big reason is the relationship with the United States. The United States has a lot of laws on the books, like the Symington Amendment, regarding nuclear proliferation and foreign aid. If Israel were a declared nuclear state that hadn't signed the Non Proliferation Treaty, or the N P T, it would make it much harder for Washington to provide the level of military aid and diplomatic cover that it currently does. Ambiguity allows the United States to maintain a policy of "don't ask, don't tell," which keeps the alliance smooth and avoids triggering domestic legal battles in Congress.
That leads perfectly into the other part of Daniel's question. What about the International Atomic Energy Agency, the I A E A? We hear about them all the time in relation to Iran because Iran is a signatory to the N P T and has to let inspectors in. Israel isn't a member of the N P T, right?
Correct. Israel is one of the few countries, along with India, Pakistan, and South Sudan, that never signed the N P T. North Korea signed it but then withdrew. Because Israel isn't a signatory, it has no legal obligation under that treaty to allow I A E A inspectors into its nuclear facilities, like the Negev Nuclear Research Center near Dimona. If Israel were to officially confirm its status, the international pressure to join the N P T and open up Dimona to full inspections would become overwhelming. It would be a diplomatic nightmare.
And I imagine opening Dimona is the last thing the Israeli defense establishment wants. They have spent sixty years keeping that place under wraps.
It would be a total loss of strategic autonomy. Once the inspectors are in, you lose the mystery. And in deterrence, mystery is a force multiplier. If an adversary doesn't know exactly how many warheads you have—estimates range from eighty to as many as four hundred—or where they are, or what their yield is, they have to assume the worst case scenario. That uncertainty makes the cost of an attack much harder for them to calculate. If you tell them you have exactly one hundred warheads, they can start building a defense system designed to stop exactly one hundred warheads. If they don't know, they are paralyzed by the "what if."
So, if we look at the pros and cons of officially confirming it, it seems like the cons are pretty heavy. But is there any scenario where confirming it would actually be in Israel's interest? I mean, we are in two thousand twenty six now. The world is changing. Iran's program is much further along than it was a decade ago. They are essentially a "threshold state" now. Does the old policy of amimut still hold up in this new reality?
That is the big debate in Israeli think tanks right now. Some argue that as Iran approaches the threshold of being a nuclear state, the era of ambiguity should end. The argument is that a clear, declared doctrine of mutually assured destruction, or M A D, would be more stable than the current shadow game. They argue that if the red lines are clearly drawn and publicly acknowledged, there is less room for miscalculation. If Iran knows exactly what will trigger a nuclear response, they might be more cautious. It is the transition from "vague deterrence" to "explicit deterrence."
But isn't there a risk that it just makes the region even more of a powder keg? If you confirm it, you are basically telling your enemies that they are permanently in second place unless they catch up. It could trigger the very arms race you were trying to avoid.
That is the counter argument, and it is the one that currently wins the day. Most experts still believe that the benefits of ambiguity outweigh the benefits of disclosure. If you declare, you lose your diplomatic shield, you trigger a massive push for sanctions from the international community—even if the United States tries to block them—and you potentially alienate your regional partners who are part of the Abraham Accords. Those countries can tolerate a quiet nuclear Israel, but a loud, declared nuclear Israel might be too much for their domestic publics to handle. It would force them to take a stand they don't want to take.
It is a delicate balance. I was reading about the Samson Option recently. It is this term used to describe Israel's supposed last resort strategy. The idea is that if the state is truly facing total destruction, they would use everything in the arsenal. It is named after the biblical figure who brought the temple down on himself and his enemies. It is a pretty grim concept, but it highlights just how deep the existential fear goes here.
It is the ultimate deterrent. It is the "wall of fire" strategy. And that is where the Jericho Three comes back in. If you have a missile that can reach thousands of kilometers, you aren't just deterring your immediate neighbors. You are sending a message to anyone in the wider world who might consider an existential threat to the country. It provides what military planners call a "second strike capability." Even if the country were hit first, those missiles, potentially hidden in hardened silos or on mobile launchers, would still be able to respond. It ensures that any victory over Israel would be a Pyrrhic one at best.
It is fascinating to think about how much of this rests on things we can't see. We live here in Jerusalem, we see the Iron Dome interceptors during escalations, we see the planes overhead, but the most powerful part of the defense is the part that is never supposed to be used and is barely even talked about. It is the ghost in the machine.
And that is the brilliance of it, from a strategic perspective. It is a weapon of the mind as much as it is a weapon of physics. The Jericho program and the nuclear program exist to make sure they never have to be used. The moment they are used, the entire strategy has failed. It is a massive investment in a tool whose only successful outcome is staying in its silo forever.
Let's talk a bit more about the technical side of the Iranian comparison. Daniel asked about the arsenals. We mentioned precision, but what about the sheer variety? Iran has been showing off these hypersonic missiles lately, or at least they claim they are hypersonic, like the Fattah two. Does Israel have an answer to that, or is the Jericho program headed in a different direction?
Israel's answer to the hypersonic threat is actually more on the defensive side with the Arrow Four and other advanced interceptors they are developing with the United States. But on the offensive side, the Jericho program is incredibly refined. When people talk about Iranian missiles, they often talk about the circular error probable, or C E P, which is basically the measure of how close a missile gets to its target. For a long time, Iranian missiles had a very high C E P, meaning they weren't very accurate. They have improved that significantly, but Israel's guidance systems, rooted in their high tech industry and their experience with satellite launches, are still widely considered to be generations ahead.
So it is the difference between a sledgehammer and a scalpel. If you have a scalpel, you don't need a thousand of them.
Exactly. And the scalpel is much more effective when you are talking about strategic deterrence. You don't need a thousand missiles if the ten you launch are guaranteed to hit exactly what you want them to hit. Furthermore, there is the issue of "survivability." Israel has invested heavily in hardening its launch sites. There are reports of massive underground complexes that can withstand a nuclear hit and still launch a counter strike. Iran has their "missile cities" underground as well, but the level of automation and rapid response in the Israeli system is thought to be much higher.
I want to go back to the I A E A for a second. If Israel were to confirm its status, how would that actually change the day to day work of the agency? Would they even be able to monitor a country that has been secret for so long? I mean, we are talking about decades of unmonitored production of fissile material.
It would be a nightmare for the I A E A. Look at how much trouble they have with Iran, where they have had some level of access for years. With Israel, they would be starting from zero. They would have to try and account for all the plutonium and highly enriched uranium produced since the nineteen sixties. They would have to verify warhead counts, inspect delivery systems, and check for hidden facilities. It would take years, if not decades, to get a clear picture. And frankly, the I A E A doesn't have the enforcement power to do much if a country simply refuses to cooperate. Their main power is reporting to the United Nations Security Council.
And we know how the Security Council goes when it comes to this region. It is usually a stalemate.
Usually a lot of debate and a lot of vetoes. So, for the I A E A, the current situation is actually somewhat easier to manage in a weird way. They don't have to worry about Israel because Israel isn't in the treaty. They can focus all their energy on the countries that are in the treaty and might be breaking the rules. If Israel joined, it would break the I A E A's budget and their diplomatic bandwidth.
That is a very cynical but probably accurate way to look at it. It is like the teacher focusing on the kid who signed the permission slip but is acting out, while the kid who never signed the slip is just sitting in the back of the room doing whatever he wants, but technically he isn't in the class.
That is a perfect analogy, Corn. Israel is the kid who never signed the permission slip to be in the Non Proliferation class. And as long as they don't cause a scene that forces the teacher to acknowledge them, the teacher is happy to look the other way.
So, looking forward, do you see any cracks in this policy of ambiguity? We have seen some Israeli politicians over the years occasionally make slips of the tongue. I remember back in the nineties and two thousands, there were a few instances. Does that erode the policy over time, or is it just noise?
There have been several moments. Back in two thousand six, Ehud Olmert, who was Prime Minister at the time, mentioned Israel in the same breath as other nuclear powers during an interview in Germany. People jumped on it, but the government quickly walked it back. More recently, in the heat of the current conflict in two thousand twenty four and twenty five, we have seen some of the more firebrand politicians make comments that imply the use of "everything we have." But the defense establishment—the people at the Ministry of Defense and I A I who actually control the keys, so to speak—are incredibly disciplined. They know that the moment the ambiguity is gone, a huge amount of Israel's strategic flexibility goes with it.
It seems like the silence is a form of strength. It is a way of saying, "we are so confident in our position that we don't even need to brag about it."
It is also about preventing a domestic political circus. If the program were public, it would be subject to budget debates in the Knesset, public oversight, and political infighting. Can you imagine the debates over how many billions should be spent on Jericho Four versus healthcare? By keeping it in the shadows, it stays under the control of a very small, very professional group of people who aren't worried about the next election cycle. It is one of the few things in this country that is truly above politics.
That is a really important point. In a democracy as vibrant and sometimes chaotic as Israel's, having your most important strategic asset shielded from the political fray is a huge advantage. It allows for long term planning that spans decades, not just four year terms.
It really is. Now, Daniel also asked about the strategic advantages of this policy. Beyond what we have discussed, there is also the element of psychological warfare. By not knowing exactly what Israel is capable of, adversaries often overestimate it. That overestimation can prevent them from taking risks that they might otherwise take if they knew the exact limits of Israel's power. It creates a "buffer of fear."
It is the monster in the closet. The one you can't see is always scarier than the one you can. If you see the monster and realize it is only six feet tall, you might think you can take it. If you only see the shadow, you assume it is twenty feet tall.
Exactly. And for a country the size of New Jersey, being the monster in the closet is a pretty good way to survive in a very tough neighborhood. It forces everyone else to play a very cautious game.
So, to wrap up the comparison with Iran, it sounds like Iran has the numbers, the variety, and the willingness to show off their hardware to project power. They want you to see the missiles in the parade. Israel has the precision, the long range reach, and a policy of silence that creates a different kind of power through mystery and uncertainty.
That is it. It is two completely different philosophies of deterrence. One is built on being loud and numerous—the "Resistance Axis" model. The other is built on being quiet and lethal—the "Begin Doctrine" model. And as of February two thousand twenty six, both sides are leaning into their respective strategies harder than ever. The stakes have never been higher.
It is a sobering thought. When you look at the Jericho Three, you are looking at one of the most sophisticated pieces of engineering on the planet, and yet its entire purpose is to never be used. It is a monument to the hope that deterrence works. It is the ultimate insurance policy that you hope you never have to collect on.
It really is. It is the peak of human ingenuity applied to the grimmest possible task. It is also worth noting that the technology developed for the Jericho program has massive spin offs in the civilian sector. Israel's entire space industry, its satellite communications, and even some of its high tech manufacturing can trace their roots back to the need to build a better ballistic missile.
You know, talking about this makes me realize how lucky we are to just be the guys talking about the prompts and not the ones making these decisions. The weight on the shoulders of the people managing these programs, keeping the secrets, and maintaining the readiness must be immense. Especially now, with the "fifteen day window" closing.
I can't even imagine, Corn. The level of responsibility is beyond comprehension. You are talking about the survival of a nation. But that is why we do this show, right? To try and peel back the layers on these complex topics so we can at least understand the forces that are shaping our world, even if we can't control them. We want to give our listeners the tools to look past the headlines.
Absolutely. And I think we have given Daniel a lot to chew on here. The Jericho program isn't just about missiles; it is about a philosophy of survival that has defined this country for sixty years. It is about the transition from a vulnerable new state to a regional superpower that can't be ignored.
It really has. From the first French designs in the nineteen sixties to the Shavit rockets launching the latest Ofeq satellites today, it is a story of technological self reliance and strategic patience. It is the ultimate "long game."
Well, I think that covers the main points. We have looked at the history, the technical specs, the comparison with Iran's quantity based approach, and the complex dance of nuclear ambiguity and the I A E A.
It was a deep dive, for sure. One of those topics where the more you know, the more you realize how much is still hidden. And maybe that is for the best. Some secrets are kept for a reason.
That is the nature of the beast. Before we sign off, I want to remind everyone that if you are finding these discussions valuable, please take a moment to leave us a review on your podcast app. Whether you are on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or anywhere else, those ratings really do help other people find the show. We are trying to grow this community of curious minds.
Yeah, we genuinely appreciate the support. It keeps us going and helps us keep these deep dives coming. We have some great prompts lined up for the rest of the month.
And of course, you can always find more information, the full archive of all seven hundred and seven episodes, and a contact form at our website, myweirdprompts dot com. If you want to reach out directly, you can email us at show at myweirdprompts dot com. We want to hear your thoughts on this—do you think ambiguity is still the right move?
We love hearing from you guys, even if the topics are as heavy as this one. It is your questions that drive the show.
Definitely. Well, Herman, thanks for bringing the expertise on this one. I feel like I have a much clearer picture of the strategic landscape now, even if it is a bit more daunting than I thought.
My pleasure, Corn. It is always good to dig into the details with you. Knowledge is the best defense against anxiety, I always say.
All right, everyone. Thanks for listening to My Weird Prompts. We will be back soon with another prompt. Until then, stay curious and stay safe.
Goodbye, everyone. Stay vigilant.
