Hey everyone, and welcome back to My Weird Prompts. I am Corn, and as always, I am joined by my brother and housemate here in Jerusalem.
Herman Poppleberry, at your service. And we have a fascinating one today. Our housemate Daniel sent us a voice memo about something that sounds like it is straight out of a Cold War thriller, but it is very much a reality of modern geopolitics.
Yeah, Daniel was asking about the intersection of intelligence and diplomacy. Specifically, how intelligence officers operate under different types of cover, and how that whole ecosystem works inside an embassy. It is one of those things where you think you know how it works from movies like The Diplomat or The Americans, but the reality is often much more bureaucratic and, frankly, much more dangerous.
It is a great question because it touches on the fundamental tension of international relations. On one hand, you have the formal, polite world of diplomacy, and on the other, the clandestine world of intelligence. And yet, they often share the same office building.
Right, and I think we should start by breaking down the two main types of cover Daniel mentioned: diplomatic cover versus non-official cover, or N-O-C. Herman, for the uninitiated, why would an intelligence agency prefer one over the other?
Well, it all comes down to risk and access. Diplomatic cover is the standard. This is when an intelligence officer is officially assigned to an embassy or consulate. They might have a title like Second Secretary, or Cultural Attaché, or even a technical role in communications. The huge advantage here is the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, specifically Article Nine. If you are under diplomatic cover, you have diplomatic immunity.
Which essentially means you cannot be prosecuted by the host country.
Exactly. If the host country catches you trying to recruit a source or stealing secrets, they cannot throw you in prison. The most they can do is declare you persona non grata, which is Latin for an unwelcome person, and kick you out of the country. You are on a plane back home within forty-eight hours. It is a safety net.
But that safety net comes with a very bright spotlight, right? I mean, if I am a counter-intelligence officer in, say, Moscow or Beijing, and a new Cultural Attaché arrives at the American embassy, I am probably going to assume they are intelligence until proven otherwise.
Oh, absolutely. In many high-tension capitals, the host country’s security service maintains a list of everyone in the embassy. They watch who they meet, where they go, and what they do. It is a very restricted life. You are essentially working in a glass house. We saw a massive example of this recently. Since the invasion of Ukraine in early twenty-twenty-two, European countries have expelled over seven hundred Russian officials they identified as intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover. That is a huge chunk of their network gone in one sweep.
So that brings us to the other side of the coin: non-official cover, or N-O-C. This is what people usually think of when they hear the word spy.
Right. An N-O-C has no official connection to their government. They might be posing as a businessman, a journalist, a student, or a representative for a non-governmental organization. They enter the country on a regular visa. They do not have a diplomatic passport. They do not live in embassy housing.
And most importantly, they do not have immunity.
No immunity whatsoever. If an N-O-C is caught, they are treated like any other criminal or, worse, a traitor or terrorist. They can be interrogated, imprisoned for decades, or even executed depending on the country. The stakes are infinitely higher. Think about the big prisoner swap in August of twenty-twenty-four. You had people like Evan Gershkovich, who was a journalist, but you also had the Dultsevs, a Russian couple living in Slovenia as ordinary citizens running an I-T company and an art gallery. They were deep-cover N-O-Cs, or illegals, and they had zero protection when they were arrested.
So why do it? Why would any agency send someone out without that protection?
Because they can go where diplomats cannot. A diplomat cannot just hang out in a local dive bar in a sensitive region or attend a private business meeting between defense contractors without raising eyebrows. An N-O-C can blend into the fabric of society. They can build relationships that are completely off the radar of the host country’s counter-intelligence. It is much harder to maintain, though. You have to actually do the job you are pretending to do. If you are an N-O-C posing as an oil consultant, you better know a lot about oil, because people will ask.
That is the part that always fascinates me: the backstopping. The agency has to create a whole life for this person. A real company, a real office, a real history.
It is incredibly expensive and labor-intensive. And in twenty-twenty-six, it is getting harder. Biometrics, facial recognition, and digital trails make it nearly impossible to manufacture a thirty-five-year-old person out of thin air. If you do not have a digital footprint that goes back fifteen years, you look suspicious immediately. We call it digital dust—the trail of social media posts, credit card transactions, and school records that prove you exist. Without it, your cover is paper-thin.
Let’s pivot back to the embassy for a second, because Daniel’s prompt had a very specific question about the internal dynamics. When you have a station, which is the intelligence unit within an embassy, does the Ambassador always know who is who?
This is where it gets into the weeds of government bureaucracy. In the United States system, for example, the Chief of Mission, which is usually the Ambassador, is the person in charge of everything that happens under their roof. By law and executive order, the Ambassador is supposed to be kept informed of all intelligence activities in their country.
So, the Ambassador knows who the Station Chief is.
Definitely. The Chief of Station and the Ambassador usually have a very close, albeit sometimes tense, relationship. The Chief of Station is essentially the Ambassador’s top advisor on clandestine matters. Generally, the Ambassador also knows every single case officer. They need to know who is operating under their authority, because if one of them gets caught, it is the Ambassador who has to deal with the diplomatic fallout.
But do they know everything? I mean, is there a limit to what the Ambassador is told?
Yes, there is a concept called compartmentalization. The Ambassador might know the names and the faces, but they might not know the specifics of every operation or the identities of the local sources. This provides plausible deniability. If a source is compromised and the host government summons the Ambassador to complain, the Ambassador can sometimes honestly say they were not briefed on the tactical details of that specific meeting.
What about the rest of the embassy staff? I am thinking of the regular State Department employees, the economic officers, the visa clerks. Do they know who the spooks are?
That is the million-dollar question. In theory, it is supposed to be a secret. But in a small, closed community like an embassy, people talk. There are often little tell-tale signs. Intelligence officers might have different pay scales or different administrative requirements. Sometimes their office is in a restricted area of the embassy called a S-C-I-F, or Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility. This is a room shielded against electronic surveillance where even other diplomats cannot go without an escort.
I have heard there is also a distinction between declared and undeclared officers. Can you explain that?
Right. A declared officer is an intelligence officer whose identity is officially shared with the host country’s intelligence service. This creates a channel for liaison. Even between rivals, like the United States and Russia, there are things they need to talk about—counter-terrorism or avoiding accidental military escalations. The declared Station Chief in Moscow might meet with their counterparts in the Russian intelligence services to discuss mutual threats. And then you have the undeclared officers. Those are the ones the host country is not supposed to know about. They are the ones actually doing the clandestine collection.
It feels like a very elaborate game of pretend. Everyone knows the game is being played, but you have to follow the rules to keep the system functioning.
It is exactly that. It is a ritual. If a diplomat is caught spying, the host country often waits until they have a specific reason to make a move. Maybe they want to retaliate for something the other country did, or maybe they just want to send a message. They will suddenly produce photos of a dead drop and declare the person persona non grata.
Daniel also asked about how information is shared. We talked about the internal embassy dynamics, but what about when the intelligence collected is actually used?
That is where the real power lies. The intelligence gathered by that station goes back to headquarters, where it is analyzed and combined with other sources. Then it is presented to the top decision-makers. The goal is to give them an edge in negotiations or to warn them of a coming crisis. The spy in the embassy is just the first link in a very long chain.
I think the biggest takeaway for me is to look past the official titles. When you see a news report about a mid-level diplomat being expelled, or a businessman being arrested for espionage, try to think about which type of cover they might have been using. It tells you a lot about the importance of the operation and the level of risk the government was willing to take.
Absolutely. Every embassy is a fortress, a listening post, and a stage for a very complex drama. And for the people involved, especially the N-O-Cs, it is a life of constant deception and high stress. They are living a lie for years at a time, often away from their families, with the threat of a foreign prison hanging over their heads. One slip-up, one person from your past recognizing you on the street, and the whole thing comes crashing down.
Well, this has been a fascinating deep dive. I definitely have a different perspective now on all those embassy buildings we see around town here in Jerusalem. Thanks to Daniel for sending in such a provocative topic.
Absolutely. And hey, if you are enjoying the show, please do us a favor and leave a review on your podcast app or on Spotify. It really helps other curious minds find us.
It really does. You can find all our past episodes and a way to get in touch with us at our website, myweirdprompts dot com. We love hearing from you all.
Thanks for joining us for another episode of My Weird Prompts. We will be back soon with more explorations into the unexpected. Until then, stay curious.
And keep those weird prompts coming. Take care, everyone.
Goodbye for now.
